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THE INTERSECTION OF NATURAL RIGHTS 
AND POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Randy E. Barnett* 
I N his article, Constitutional PositivisiJl/ Fred Schauer makes a number of intriguing observations about the possible relevance of 
natural law to constitutional adjudication. He identifies the natural law 
position as holding that 
law itself, just like the content of many laws, is derived from 
fundamental conceptions of morality. As a result, legal sys-
tems (and perhaps even particular laws) unfaithful to those 
moral conceptions are exemplars of erroneous derivations from 
first moral principles and are therefore not genuinely legal at 
all.2 
Against this view stands legal positivism which holds that 
laws and legal systems satisfying certain sociological criteria 
count as laws and legal systems, regardless of their moral con-
tent. Hence the central positivist claim [is] ... that the exis-
tence of law is conceptually distinct from its moral worth.3 
As a conceptual description of law, Professor Schauer endorses consti-
tutional positivism," although he in no manner denies that moral rea-
soning might be relevant to adjudication in some legal system or even 
every existing legal system. 
In this brief essay, I wish to describe what I see to be the unavoid-
able connection between natural law--or, more accurately, natural 
rights-and the positive law that is the subject of constitutional adjudi-
* Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
1. Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L REV 797 (1993). 
2. ld. at 799. 
3. ld. at 800-01. 
4. Elsewhere he identifies his position as "presumptive posith·ism." See Frederick Schauer, 
Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 645, 674-79 (1991). 
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cation. This connection would exist whether or not there is a conceptual 
distinction between natural and positive law of the sort that Schauer 
maintains. Because of this connection, judges in a world in which legal 
positivism is "true" should act, on occasion, as though the natural 
rights approach is' correct. And if this is true then, I maintain, the nat· 
ural rights position, in some important sense, is correct. Finally, I will 
take issue with Professor Schauer's intimation that the appropriate do· 
main of moral reasoning is limited largely to constitutional adjudica· 
tion and to the Supreme Court of the United States.5 
I. THE MORAL IMPLICATION OF A PERCEIVED DUTY TO OBEY THE 
LAW 
My thesis is really quite simple. While it may be true-as Profes· 
sor Schauer argues-that we can distinguish conceptually between 
what the law "is" and what it "ought to be," between "law," on the 
one hand, and "justice," on the other,6 this distinction establishes less 
5. Because Professor Schauer offers so much of his analysis as suggestive and concludes that 
"[t]here are no answers here," my thesis may not actually be inconsistent with his claims. But I 
think it is inconsistent with at least some of the impressions his presentation evokes. 
6. Dworkin's criticism of this central claim of positivism is considered by Schauer. He rc· 
sponds that: 
If Dworkin is right ... the only hope for those who would be morally disturbed by the 
results that Justice Thomas would reach is to try to get better judges, for the task of 
trying to get Justice Thomas to lower his moral sights by focusing only on some pula· 
tively narrower range of materials is, as a descriptive matter, a complete nonstarter. 
Schauer, supra note I, at 824. In his later writings, however, Dworkin has made clear that he 
limits the range of interpretation to that which is "internal" to the particular legal system in 
question. That is, Hercules does not attempt to enforce only just laws, but to lind interpretations 
of the law that would make it the best law it can be in light of all other decisions, statutes and 
other authoritative legal pronouncements. In sum, Hercules' task is to rationalize the authoritative 
legal directives from within his legal universe. Having accomplished this Hercules has stated what 
the law "is." Nonetheless, this law-even so interpreted-may still be unjust. 
So while I may agree with Schauer that "the constitutional positivist can study and identify 
constitutional law as such without approving of it morally, and without feeling any part of the 
enterprise," id. at 806, I agree with Dworkin that to do constitutional law even a positivist must 
learn how to think as though he believed in the constitutional enterprise. 
Schauer himself attributes something like this internal point of view to constitutional scholars 
and particularly natural law scholars when he asserts that "the typical American constitutionalist 
thinks that the American constitutional tradition is generally worthy," id, at 805, and that "there 
is a tendency from a natural constitutional law perspective to think that a good deal of the Ameri· 
can constitutional tradition has been morally tested and found worthy." /d. To the contrary, natu-
ral law-and especially natural rights-thinking has always been primarily a radical philosophy 
and for that reason opposed. See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, In THE WORKS 
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489, 49 I -94 (John Bowring ed., 1962) ( 1838). The basic conservatism of the 
American judiciary has led it to reject, not embrace, natural law as positing a "brooding omni· 
presence in the sky." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 {1917) (Holmes, J., 
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than meets the eye. To understand why, we must consider an interpre-
tation of the natural law-positivist debate that nowadays is dismissed as 
mundane: "that the natural law position is merely a claim about lan-
guage and about the criteria for proper use of the word 'law' ... . "1 
Though this semantic interpretation of the natural law-positivist debate 
may be well known and boring, it has a significant moral implication 
that is widely overlooked. This implication derives from the widespread 
belief tha_t there is at least a prima facie moral duty to obey the law. 
While modern legal positivists may deny-as they must if they 
wish to preserve the value-neutral use of the term "law"-that there is 
such a duty of obedience, this denial is simply beside the point. For, so 
long as speaker and listeners both believe that law carries with it at 
least a prima facie duty of obedience-that law qua law binds in con-
science-then how we use or define the term law is not an arbitrary or 
value-free matter. The conclusion that a particular course of action is 
required by law will carry with it the perception that this action is, in a 
real sense, morally obligatory-at least prima facie. 
Schauer himself professes neutrality about the issue. He asserts 
that "nothing about legal positivism entails any attitude whatsoever 
about obedience to law."8 This claim holds, however, only if law is a 
strictly value-neutral concept. Only then would the mere fact that 
something is a valid law carry with it no duty of obedience. When, 
however, the popular perception that law does carry with it a duty of 
obedience is taken into account, then asking what counts as law, and 
thus as binding law (as opposed to positivist law simpliciter), is no 
longer a value-neutral inquiry. 
Consider this example: A duly enacted statute requires that people 
own, possess, and are proficient with handguns.9 If the fact that this 
statute was duly enacted says nothing about whether a citizen is bound 
in conscience to obey it, as Schauer maintains, then the positivists are 
correct in asserting both the conceptual and operational separation of 
law and justice. If, on the other hand, the fact that this statute was 
duly enacted means in the relevant community of discourse that people 
"ought" to obey it, then, at least prima facie, a person would be 
dissenting). 
7. Schauer, supra note 1, at 799 (emphasis added). 
8. /d. at 806 n.18. 
9. Cf. Alaska Votes to Bar Towns from Regulating Guns, NY TIMES, June 6, 1982, § I, at 
27 (describing Kennesaw, Georgia's ordinance requiring a head of household to own and maintain 
a firearm). 
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thought to be acting wrongly not to do so and, significantly, it may then 
be considered justified to coerce this person to so act. 
Thus, in a particular community of discourse, the positive meaning 
of a statute is not limited to what actions it directs (e.g., "own, possess, 
and be proficient with a handgun"), but implicitly includes the further 
proposition that "one has a moral obligation (at least prima facie) to 
own, possess, and be proficient with a handgun and can be sanctioned 
justly for disobedience." Consequently, as an operational matter, 
we-meaning both participants in and those observing the legal system 
in question-must ask whether this further proposition is true. 
If some person-say a sheriff-files a complaint and seeks legal 
sanctions10 against a person who has failed to possess a handgun, is this 
complaint valid? More specifically, is it valid merely because the al-
leged conduct violates a legally enacted statute? Or must considera-
tions of justice or rights be brought to bear so as to decide whether it is 
in fact justified to coerce a person to perform these actions? Positivists 
cannot use the term "law" both ways.11 
If this example appears farfetched, there may be a tendency to 
dismiss it as something of a throw-back to the old debates about 
whether Nazi-inspired German law was really law. Today, these de-
bates may seem limited to extreme or radically pathological legal situa-
tions, and consequently they are sometimes said to teach us little about 
law in basically just legal systems. But in formulating this hypothetical 
statute I really had a far from farfetched example in mind: drug 
prohibition. 
Is it morally justified to send someone to the penitentiary or to 
seize all her assets (and possibly to kill her for resisting any such ef-
10. I use the term sanction, because I wish not to limit the category of forcibly extracted legal 
relief to punishment. Monetary damages and injunctive relief raise the same type of moral 
questions. 
11. Although natural law theorists can and do. When Aquinas questions whether an unjust 
law is really a law, he is perfectly willing to identify the subject of this inquiry as a "law" for 
purposes of determining whether it is a law. See Thpmas Aquinas, On Natural Law, In READINGS 
IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3, 7 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 1984) ("Human Jaw has the 
nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason .... But in so far as it deviates from reason, 
it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law, but of violence."). For a natural law 
theorist, the difference between a "law" and a law is that the latter binds in conscience while the 
former does not. See id. at II ("Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, 
they have the power of binding in conscience .... "). Other legal cultures have it easier. They 
have one word that is limited to enacted rules (e.g., Gesetz, /oi, ley, zakon, torveny) and another 
that also includes principles of justice (e.g., Recht, droit, derecho, prava, jog). See George P. 
Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 980-82 (1981). 
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forts) for possessing or selling marijuana or cocaine solely because 
these drug "laws" have been properly enacted? (Was it just to do the 
same to people who brewed beer or distilled whiskey during the first 
prohibition?) Apparently, many people believe that laws should be 
obeyed. Else why would the many persons who think that criminalizing 
drugs-marijuana in particular-is such a bad idea stand by so quietly 
as today's heretics12-drug users-are herded into the brutality of 
modern prisons? They acquiesce because "the law" is doing it. 
Suppose the home of a person who grows large quantities of mari-
juana for sale is invaded by armed robbers who attempt to seize the 
grower's cash. Would the illegal grower be justified in forcibly resisting 
the invasion? Of course. Now suppose that this same home is invaded 
by armed D.E.A. agents who attempt to seize the cash, the marijuana, 
and the grower herself. Would she be justified in forcibly resisting the 
invasion? Most believe and would answer "of course not." Should 
D.E.A. agents be killed by a grower defending herself, she would be 
prosecuted for murder and no one would object.13 Why not? For many, 
the answer is that the agents were operating "under color of law." 
If all this is correct, then despite the fact that we can distinguish 
conceptually between the law and morals-between the requirements 
of the Controlled Substances Act and its justice-it is not true that the 
term "law" is used in a morally neutral way. In fact, the term "law" is 
used precisely to decide that the marijuana grower is not a victim of 
injustice whose rights have been violated but is instead a murderer who 
has violated the rights of another. If so, then deciding what to call a 
law is also not a morally neutral activity. If the label law is to engender 
so serious a consequence, then at some point in the labeling process, 
justice or rights must be taken into account before a decision that some 
enactment is a genuine law is made. Before we conclude that an enact-
ment is a law that persons may be killed to enforce, we require nothing 
less than a reliable institutional defense of that law as just.14 And this 
12. See GEORGE H. SMITH, ATHEISM. AYN RAND. AND OTHER HERESIES 233 (1991) (COmp3r-
ing the punishment of drug users with Augustine's doctrine of "righteous persecution" that was 
used by the Spanish Inquisition to punish Christian heretics). 
13. While this commentary was being edited, this hypothetical was brought to life by the 
Texas gun fight between agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tob:leco and Firearms and the Branch 
Davidian religious £ect (or "cult" if we wish to express our disapproval). Very few (outside of 
Texas) have asked whether the law the A.T.F. agents were attempting to enforce \vas just or even 
whether it had actually been violated. 
14. So while it may be true as a conceptual matter that "one whose job p3rtly involves law 
application could do that part of the job without having to engage in any moral reasoning whatso-
ever," ScJtauer, supra note 1, at 802, and that "positivist judges, were they so inclined, could in 
858 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:853 
is where natural rights meet constitutional adjudication. 
II. ENFORCING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF LEGITIMACY 
For nearly everyone, the fact that a particular item of food-say a 
sausage-is offered for sale means that it is wholesome.11; Merely offer-
ing the sausage for sale is an assertion made by the seller that it is free 
from disease, unless the seller makes some expression to the contrary. 
The Uniform Commercial Code reflects this conventional understand-
ing by implying in every contract of sale a warranty of 
merchantability.16 
The implication of the analysis of Part I was that by offering an 
enactment as a "law," a legal system is impliedly warranting the 
merchantability of the enactment. "Merchantability" in this context 
means that the law is sufficiently consistent with justice so as to create 
a prima facie duty of obedience in the citizenry. This duty of obedience 
means both that citizens are bound in conscience to obey the law and 
that they may be coerced to some extent to secure their obedience or 
punished for their disobedience. 
Of course this implicit assertion could be denied. A legislature 
could attach a rider to its enactment saying that "this statute does not 
create any duty of obedience in the citizenry. Nor does its enactment 
actually justify the use of force to secure compliance with its dictates." 
That legislation carries no such expressed disclaimer and that such a 
disclaimer would be considered absurd/7 underscores the power of the 
some systems get away with an amoral conception of their task," id., we may well ask what 
exactly these jurists have accomplished when they apply positive law in this amoral way. We know 
that, by their own admission,- they have done nothing to suggest that the laws they arc applying 
are just. 
IS. By wholesome, I mean only that a sausage is fresh and untainted by disease. I am not 
suggesting that eating sausages is good for one's health or that grocers implicitly warrant that this 
is true. · 
16. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1990): 
Unless excluded or modified ... , a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is 
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on 
the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
Of course, the imposition of such a warranty on every seller who does not expressly disclaim it 
does more than impute to the seller an assertion that the goods in question are fit for the purpose 
for which they are expected to be used. It also imputes to the seller an assumption of legal respon· 
sibility should this fail to be the case. 
17. Even so-called nonbinding "resolutions" are passed by Congress precisely because it is 
thought ihat their enactment does create a duty of obedience even if it does not justify enforce· 
ment of this duty. The whole point behind the passage of nonbinding resolutions is to provide a 
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implied warranty of legitimacy or justice created by every enactment. 
In this regard, the controversy between positivists and natural law 
theorists can be conceived as a truth-in-labeling debate. Natural law 
theorists accuse positivists of "bait-and-switch." What we label a law is 
supposed to be strictly value-neutral, until the U.S. Marshals order you 
to "open up in the name of the law" and then beat down your door 
with a sledgehammer. Only then do we discover that purportedly value-
neutral enactments have been replaced with official commands that one 
supposedly has a moral duty to obey. 
But whence comes this legitimacy? Let us consider sausages. Con-
sumers do not themselves inspect for wholesomeness each sausage they 
purchase. Nor, if they ever stopped to consider the matter, do they re-
ally believe that each and every sausage is inspected by the manufac-
turer or by health officials. Rather the tacit belief is that the process by 
which sausages are made is such as to produce sausages that are free of 
contamination. And this process includes both procedures for making 
sausages and periodic inspections of some sausages so produced to see 
if the procedures are being followed. 
In the case of food, the tacit assertion by the seller is probably 
something like the following: "By offering these sausages for sale, I 
assert that I have purchased them from a reputable manufacturer who 
in turn has tacitly asserted to me that it uses procedures that are ade-
quate to assure that virtually every sausage produced is suitable for 
human consumption." Similarly, a legal system is asserting the follow-
ing about its enactments: "By offering this enactment for consumption 
and adherence by citizens, and by authorizing officials to use force to 
compel obedience to its requirements and to apprehend and punish 
those who fail to comply, we assert that the process by which this en-
actment was made is adequate to assure that virtually every enactment 
produced is just." 
Of course, both of these assertions could be accepted on faith. In-
deed they are. Most people neither kn9w nor care to know how sau-
sages or how laws are made. But it is perfectly appropriate to ask in 
each case whether the assertions are, in fact, true. Are the procedures 
followed by the sausage manufacturer such that wholesome sausages 
are the invariable result? Are the procedures followed by the legal sys-
tem such that just laws are the invariable result? Or to relax the sever-
ity of the assertion a bit: Are the procedures followed by the legal sys-
moral reason for someol}e to act as the legislature would wish. 
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tern reliable enough to justify the presumption of legitimacy that 
attaches to what is labeled "law"? Of course, this question is inherently 
constitutional (with a small "c").18 
At this juncture in the discussion, two schools of American consti-
tutional thought emerge. Judicial skeptics-sometimes called judicial 
conservatives-believe that the processes followed by the legislative and 
executive branches-including, importantly, the fact that members of 
both are popularly elected-are sufficient to engender confidence in 
whatever emerges from the process and that judicial review is unlikely 
to improve upon this process. In sum, as compared with the institu-
tional alternatives, when it comes to making just laws, in legislatures 
they trust. 
Legislative skeptics-sometimes misleadingly called judicial activ-
ists-believe in a principle that, in another context, has been phrased 
"trust, but verify." That is, while some deference may be due to the 
process that produces enactments, we know enough about the tremen-
dous weaknesses of these processes-including the weaknesses of popu-
larly-elected representative government (as distinct from "democ-
racy")19-to require that when challenged the outcomes of these 
processes be reviewed to see if they are truly wholesome or just. While 
legislative skeptics may trust the legislative process enough to allocate 
to it the responsibility to initiate and draft the enactments that may 
eventually bind as laws, they do not think we are justified in labeling 
legislative enactments "laws"-with all that term connotes in this com-
munity of discourse-until a meaningful examination for wholesome-
ness is conducted by some other institution that is less affected by the 
18. This question also accepts Schauer's view that the telling issue separating theorists may be 
not whether there are such things as natural rights, but whether "empowering the judiciary to 
locate and enforce them will produce a morally worse state than declining to so empower the 
judiciary." Schauer, supra note I, at 819-20. This debate can be located within the liberal concep-
tion of the rule of law. 
19. Schauer provides a graphic example of this weakness in his characterization of the public 
deliberation over the role of the judiciary raised by the published speeches of Clarence Thomas: 
(P]ublic debate about natural law and its relationship to constitutional theory was likely 
to be as fruitful as a discussion of quantum physics on Larry King Live. Against the 
background noise of grinding axes, soundbites replaced analysis, inflammatory examples 
substituted for argument, and there was little concern about inconsistencies between the 
rhetoric deployed against Thomas and that deployed against Judge Bork only four years 
earlier. 
/d. at 797. Legislative skeptics would expect as much. The only aspect of the legislative process 
that works less well are deliberations that are out of public view in which interest group influence 
can have free rein. · 
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problems of interest20 that we know to be pervasive in the legislative 
arena. 
Legislative skeptics view courts as performing this function, not 
because they especially trust judges or because courts are perfect or 
unaffected by interest,21 but because, for many well-known institutional 
reasons, they are superior enough to legislatures to provide some inde-
pendent assessment of legitimacy. And, for better or worse, in our hier-
archical monopolistic legal system, courts are the only institution avail-
able to perform this crucial function.22 
Thus, legislative skepticism accords to courts the responsibility of 
assuring that the quality has gone in before the name "law" goes on. 
This job includes both the herculean task of interpreting the meaning 
of enactments so as to make them the best they can be, but also the 
task of seeing if the "best" is good enough. That is, the courts should 
assess whether even the best interpretation of an enactment is sufficient 
to justify a prima facie duty of obedience in the citizenry and to justify 
using coercion on those who fail to obey. 
But what is the nature of this inquiry into legitimacy'? Does it 
mean that every law must be morally right, in which case skepticism 
that judges (or anyone else) can make such a moral assessment leads to 
an attitude of strong deference to legislatures? It is at this juncture 
that natural rights theory parts company from (at least some) natural 
law theory. 
Natural law can be viewed as encompassing all aspects of moral-
ity. That is, it entails an objective assessment of the propriety of all 
human action. It distinguishes vice from virtue. Whether I should 
waste my life gambling (or gamboling) or whether I should get an edu-
cation and make something of myself is a question addressed by natu-
ral law. If all enforced law is to be evaluated from this perspective, as 
most critics of a natural law approach assume,23 then two powerful ob-
jections immediately follow. First, courts are hopelessly incompetent, 
20. Or that is affected by interests that arc less likely to produce unjust outcomes. 
21. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
22. See Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Sor:iety: Part Two-Crime Prel·entlon 
and the Legal Order, CR!M. JuST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1986, at 30 (describing the op:ration or 
a hypothetical polycentric legal order). 
23. Even Aquinas did not go this far in a statement with a decidedly modern, if not liberal, 
ring: 
Now human law is framed for the multitude of human beings, the majority of whom arc 
not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the \irtu-
ous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to 
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even as compared with legislatures, to make such judgments. Second, 
allowing government to make such judgments would lead to a totalitar-
ian or, at the very least, to an illiberal society. It is safe to assert that 
these two concerns motivate most criticisms of the idea that judges 
should be allowed to take the natural law into their own hands when 
reviewing legislation. 
In contrast is the natural rights position. While this decidedly lib-
eral approach grew out of the natural law tradition, it was and still 
remains distinct from it. Whereas the natural law approach can be 
characterized as the "morality of aspiration," the natural rights ap-
proach is' more aptly characterized as the "morality of duty."24 More 
precisely, natural rights theory deals not with the general morality of 
individual conduct, but with the legal protections each person requires 
to pursue happiness while living in society with others. Far from view-
ing individuals as atoms, the natural rights tradition views some per-
sons as weaker than others and all individuals as invariably weaker 
than the group. 
Natural rights define the moral space within which persons must 
be free to make their own choices and live their own lives. They are 
rights insofar as they entail enforceable claims on other persons (in-
cluding those who call themselves "government officials"). And they 
are natural insofar as their necessity depends upon the (contingent) 
nature of persons and the social and physical world in which persons 
reside.2 G 
As is readily apparent, a natural rights approach is far less ambi-
tious and moralistic than traditional natural law reasoning and conse-
quently far less conducive to a totalitarian or illiberal, regime. Indeed, 
natural rights are a necessary part of the antidote to such regimes. Yet • 
a natural rights approach still would seem to be vulnerable to the 
charge that judges are incompetent to discern exactly what are the nat-
ural rights of all persons. 
Although I cannot fully respond to this concern here, let me begin 
a response by outlining the method of analysis that I have only started 
abstain; and chiefly those that are injurious to others, without the prohibition of which 
human society could not be maintained. Thus human law prohibits murder, theft and the 
like. 
Aquinas, supra note II, at II (emphasis added). 
24. See LON L. FULLER. THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-6 (1964) (distinguishing the two 
moralities). 
25. This dependence, however, does not mean that such rights are "presocial." To the con· 
trary, rights are only needed when persons live in society with others. 
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to develop elsewhere.26 This method is not, strictly speaking, a pure 
natural rights approach to law,27 but rather is a natural rights ap-
proach to constitutional adjudication. This is fitting given that Profes-
sor Schauer's thesis concerns constitutional positivism. 
In brief, natural rights define the moral jurisdiction of each person 
to use certain physical resources (including her body) in the world.28 
While these rights can be stated very abstractly, in practice they must 
be determined or "posited" conventionally and, in our legal culture, 
have been so determined by common law adjudicative processes.29 
Thus, the common law principles of property, contract, tort, restitution, 
and agency (this list is not exhaustive of potential categories) provide 
the basic legal definitions of these natural rights. This is the work that 
judges have been doing for centuries. 
Some, but far from all, government enactments restrict the exer-
cise of these "rightful" liberties.30 That is, they tell someone that they 
cannot engage in behavior that is otherwise rightful according to the 
laws of contract, property, tort, etc. When they do, they may be viewed 
26. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Consen·atism v. A Principled Judicial Acti,·-
ism, 10 HARV. J.L & PuB. PoL'Y 273 (1987); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated Con-
stitutional Rights and the Rule of l.JJw, 14 HARV. J.L & PUB PoL'Y 615 (1991); Randy E. 
Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED B\' TilE 
PEOPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 
1993). 
27. See infra note 34. 
28. I describe and begin to provide a functional defense of this conception of natural rights in 
Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Se,·eral Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc PIIIL & 
PoL'Y 62 (1992). 
29. In this respect, Schauer provides a false dichotomy between a natural rights apprroch and 
"legal positivism, according to which law is not deri,·ed necessarily from fundamental moral prin-
ciples, but rather is simply 'posited' by human beings and human institutions." Schauer, supra 
note I, at 799 (emphasis added). Under a natural rights appro:~ch, legal rules are not "derived 
from" natural rights, but are derived by mean of normal techniques of legal reasoning. The con-
ventional rules and principles that result from this reasoning arc then subjected to critical scrutiny 
to see whether they are compatible with relatively abstract natural rights. In this way, judges (or 
legislators) who respect natural rights must still "posit" the rules and principles we call law. 
Legal positivism originally gained its name not from the fact that it acknowledged that law 
was "posited"-a claim about human law that Aquinas, for example, would have readily acknowl-
edged-but from John Austin's theory that the law owes its obligatory nature or legitimacy to the 
"position" of the lawgiver as sovereign. 
30. Of ceurse, many such liberty-restricting statutes enacted during the p:!St century purport 
merely to codify or systemize these common law principles. How arc these clTorts to be distin-
guished from rights infringements? Addressing this important issue would take me too far afield. 
Suffice it to say that most legislative interferences with liberty make no such claim. Instead they 
claim to override, not refine, these principles. 
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as "infringing" these persons' natural rights.31 The fact of this infringe-
ment is morally significant in two ways. 
First, it requires justification. That is, legislative will alone is not 
enough to justify such infringement. Such exercises of will must be 
both "necessary and proper" to the execution of some legitimate gov-
ernmental power. To assure that such legislation is indeed necessary 
and proper, the onus falls upon those seeking to exercise these powers, 
when properly challenged, to show that they are in fact justified. And a 
neutral magistrate must adjudicate the claims. 
Second, when government sustains its burden of proving that a 
rights infringement is both necessary and proper, natural rights do not 
forever after evaporate. These rights are inalienable and remain always 
in the background so that future claims of powers, as well as continued 
use of powers approved in the past, must still be necessary and proper. 
In sum, even when properly overridden, these rights are "retained by 
the people."32 
According to this account, then, the existence of natural rights 
both helps to set the baseline definition of rightful conduct and places 
the onus of proof on those who would restrict the exercise of otherwise 
rightful conduct. To identify the background rights requires no greater 
talents of identification than are currently performed by judges in their 
private law capacity. And it places the burden on advocates of legisla-
tion to generate proof that their acts are justified. Judges then merely 
listen and evaluate what they hear. 
So while Schauer is correct to ·claim that because "there are natu-
ral rights does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is the task 
of particular officials to identify and enforce them,"33 there are institu-
tional and, indeed, moral reasons why this conclusion may be war-
ranted. Laws that violate the natural rights of a person do not bind that 
person in conscience and do not justify the use of coercion against that 
person unless it is shown that such exercises of power are necessary and 
proper.34 Thus the enterprise of labeling enactments. laws does lead, if 
31. We may say that such enactments have violated natural rights as they have been defined 
by positive Jaw, in which case we would be accepting the basic conceptual distinction between 
natural rights and positive Jaw that is urged by Schauer. 
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
33. Schauer, supra note I, at 809. 
34. The fact that inalienable natural rights can be infringed permissibly if the infringement is 
shown to be both necessary and proper distinguishes this approach to constitutional adjudication 
from a purely libertarian natural rights approach to law. With the latter, no infringement of 
natural rights would be permissible. 
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not inexorably then plausibly, to the claim that it is the moral duty of 
each member of every branch of the lawmaking process, including 
_courts, to scrutinize enactments purporting to be laws to see if they 
have the "moral" or rights-respecting qualities that such laws must 
have. And the more that legislators abstain from such scrutiny, the 
greater becomes the responsibility of judges to do so. 
If this is correct, then Schauer's suggested "irrelevance of much of 
the traditional natural law /positivism debate to contemporary ques-
tions of constitutional interpretation"3G is either wrong or highly mis-
leading.36 Moral inspection to ensure that natural rights have not been 
violated is, in Schauer's words,· "necessarily part of every act of law 
identification (and therefore of law application), [so that] one whose 
job partly involves law application could not do that part without en-
gaging in moral reasoning. "37 
III. How LIMITED IS THE DOMAIN OF NATURAL RIGHTS IN 
ADJUDICATION? 
I am now in a position to address Professor Schauer's contention 
that whatever inquiries into the justice of a law are warranted become 
increasingly inapplicable "the further one moves away from the mor-
ally soaked subject of constitutional law, and the further one moves 
away from (even within constitutional law) the Supreme Court of the 
United States."38 
Schauer claims that if moral reasoning by judges applies only 
within the limited domain of constitutional law and then only within 
the even more limited domain of Supreme Court adjudication, the dis-
tinction between law and justice that positivism advocates is descrip-
tively important. Let us grant this point. Nonetheless, I think that the 
35. Schauer, supra note 1, at 803. 
36. As he himself points out immediately after the p3553ge quoted supra in the text accomp:l-
nying note 33, "at this point the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism returns to 
the arena." Schauer, supra note I, at 809. Eltactly. 
37. /d. at 802. By moral reasoning, I (though not Schauer) mean determining that natural 
rights have not been unnecessarily or improperly infringed. 
38. Id. at 824. He continues: 
[I]f we think of the limited domain notion of law as treating text, precedent, and p1:rhaps 
other authoritative materials as relatively distinct from other sources, then it is possible to 
imagine that the indications of those sources could be taken as at least presumptively 
controlling by some class of constitutional deeisionmakers. And it is possible that these 
indications of law qua law would be more likely clearer for a larger p1:rcentage or deci-
sions the further one gets from the Supreme Court. 
/d. at 824-25 (footnote omitted). 
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argument as presented understates the size of the domain in which law 
and natural rights or justice intersect. 
First, the intersection of law and justice is not limited to constitu-
tional adjudication in the Supreme Court. Every law that affects the 
liberty of a citizen may potentially violate that citizen's natural rights. 
Therefore, every assertion of legal jurisdiction over the life of a citizen 
may be critically assessed. (by someone) to see whether this is a just or 
an unjust interference with that citizen's rightful liberty. According to 
the linkage between natural rights and constitutional adjudication I am 
sketching here, whenever Congress enacts a statute that affects the lib-
erty of a citizen and the President signs it, this law may be just or 
unjust and an "independent tribunal[] of justice"39 should examine the 
statute to see if it is consistent or inconsistent with the natural rights of 
the citizen. 
If the courts assume this role, then the inquiry will begin at the 
district court level. Uriless the very same law has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court (which is unlikely40) a district court judge is as obliged 
to. consider the justice or rights question as the appellate court that 
considers her opinion and the Supreme Court, which considers the ap-
pellate court's opinion. In sum, if Supreme Court justices should en-
gage in this sort of analysis in constitutional adjudication with regard 
to a federal statute, then so should every other federal judge. While 
still limited, the domain in which law and natural rights intersect has 
expanded. 
Nor is the relevance of natural rights limited to the public law 
domain of constitutional adjudication. As I have described it, within 
constitutional adjudication judges must determine if the natural rights 
of persons have been infringed by specific enactments. But this leaves 
us with the obvious and difficult question, what are a person's natural 
rights? 
As I explained above, the distinction between rightful and wrong-
ful conduct has traditionally been the subject of the private law of con-
tract, property, tort, agency, restitution, etc. Reasoning within each of 
39. I ANNALS OF CoNG. 439 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
Madison). This phrase was used by Madison during his speech to the first House of Reprcscnta· 
tives defending the efficacy of a bill of rights on the grounds that such tribunals "will consider 
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bul-
wark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive." /d. 
40. The likelihood changes when we consider state legislatures enacting statutes, e.g., death 
penalty statutes, because such statutes of other states have been upheld previously by the Supreme 
Court. 
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these fields attempts to provide legal conceptualizations of abstract nat-
ural rights. Consequently, the legal rules and principles that emerge 
from such private law adjudication can and should also be subject to 
moral scrutiny. 
For example, is imposing obligations to act or refrain from acting 
on persons without their consent a violation of natural rights and conse-
quently unjust?. Contract law principles generally counsel refraining 
from such impositions, while tort law attempts to describe the circum-
stances when such impositions of obligation are not unjust.41 In this 
way, common law adjudication of private law questions provides the 
following legal baseline against which a statute's constitutionality is to 
be assessed: has the statute restricted the rightful liberty of a citizen? 
When setting this baseline too, judges must take justice into account. 
So judges-primarily state court judges-must take justice or an-
tecedent natural rights into account in the domain of private law. The 
results. of this process provide a baseline in the constitutional domain 
against which to assess when statutes are or are not infringing natural 
rights. At that juncture, the justice and necessity of this infringement 
of natural rights must then be assessed by state or federal judges. The 
domain in which law and natural rights intersect has grown quite large 
indeed. 
What then is excluded? Any enactment that does not seck to limit 
coercively the rightful liberty of a citizen, either because there is no 
sanction attached to disobedience (a rare occurrence) or because the 
statute concerns the dispensation of benefits (a common occurrence) or 
because the statute regulates the internal operation of government it-
self42 (an even more common occurrence). 
So in the end, although I maintain that the domain of inescapable 
intersection between justice and law is a good deal larger than Schauer 
intimates, I want to insist on the limited domain thesis myself. For, the 
fact that judicial scrutiny of enactments for their conformity with 
rights or justice is limited to those enactments that seek to restrict the 
exercise of rightful liberty contributes to the practicality of authorizing 
such scrutiny. It is simply not the case that such scrutiny would be 
41. It is precisely for this reason that some who would exp:md greatly the numb:r of legal 
obligations wish to eliminate the traditional distinction between contract and tort. 
42. Where such statutes affect the liberty of persons they do so in the government's cap:~city 
of either employer or property owner. While these categories are hardly self-evident. inviolate. or 
unproblematic, they do represent a principled distinction between government regulation restrict· 
ing rightful liberty and all other government enactments. 
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made of all, or even of much, legislation. So we can safely authorize it 
where it is both needed and appropriate. Moreover, the use of prece-
dent by the Supreme Court and lower courts further reduces the need 
for unfettered case-by-case analysis. Once stricken, a similar statute is 
presumptively unconstitutional as well and the issue need not be consid-
ered de novo.43 
IV. SUMMARY 
The analysis presented here can be summarized in three sentences: 
So long as obedience to law is perceived in some sense as obligatory, 
the intersection between positive constitutional law and natural rights is 
both crucial and unavoidable. And without some independent judicial 
scrutiny to see that the requisite quality has gone into an enactment 
before the name "law" goes on, the implied warranty of 
merchantability that necessarily accompanies all enacted legislation is 
but an empty and- irredeemable promise. Finally, though broader than 
Professor Schauer intimates, the domain of this judicial scrutiny is still 
limited to a subset of all governmental enactments or orders-the ones 
that infringe a persons's rightful exercise of liberty. 
43. For reasons pertaining to the presumption of liberty, I am more sympathetic with prece· 
dent when finding statutes unconstitutional than when finding them constitutional. 
